Among the intellectual ideals inherited from the Enlightenment, autonomy is considered the most valuable and essential in the pursuit of a rich intellectual life. But this ideal contrasts with the reality of our permanent dependence in epistemic matters. We constantly rely on others and need to place our trust in them in order to epistemically secure most of our more cherished beliefs. Some recent versions in virtue epistemology emphasize the role of the agent in the acquisition of epistemically valuable beliefs. No doubt, the cognitive character of epistemic subjects and how they are involved in the task of knowing are crucial in our understanding of the very value of knowledge. Moreover, a reflective turn suggested by certain foundationalist trends in epistemology has shaped under a new light the question of the normativity of our epistemic agency, specially in cases of judging and other active epistemic tasks performed by the subject. What is then the place we have to give to agents in epistemology? The aim of this conference is to discuss both the role of the autonomous epistemic agent in the acquisition of knowledge and the role that the dependence on others (and also on artifacts) has in our epistemic endeavors.